BEYOND THE ROSTER? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL EXERCISE BY THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT

In an appeal filed under Section 14-A of the Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the “SC/ST Act”), challenging refusal of grant of anticipatory bail by the Special Court (Atrocities), the Bombay High Court’s Aurangabad bench, recently quashed the FIR filed against not only the appellants but also an FIR filed against the complainant/informant and her relatives. This development raises concerns over the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction under section 14-A of the SC/ST Act, more particularly the powers to quash FIR in an appeal seeking grant of anticipatory bail where the Bench was not assigned with charge to quash FIRs or criminal proceedings. The article attempts to critically analyse the legal issues through a jurisdictional lens; it’s implications and repercussions of exercise of such powers by the High Court, beyond the allocation of jurisdiction under the High Court’s roster.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The present matter deals with common judgment passed by the Bombay High Court bench at Aurangabad in criminal appeals filed by appellants under section 14-A of the SC/ST Act, challenging the Special Court (Atrocities) orders denying anticipatory bail in Crime No. 351 of 2025 for offenses punishable under sections 351(2), 252, and 35 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (henceforth referred to as the “BNS”), as well as Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The High Court dealt with Crime No. 354 of 2025, which was filed at the same police station and involved the informant relative for offenses punishable under Sections 74, 333, 152, 352, 351(2), and 3(5) of the BNS. The proceeding before the High Court, in the appeal, were only challenging the rejection of anticipatory bail by the Special Court (Atrocities).

During the pendency of the appeal, the appellants were granted interim protection by the High Court. Thereafter, the informant filed an affidavit stating that a compromise was entered into by the informant and the appellants; she didn't want to pursue the matter further and if the appellants are granted bail, she would not have any objection if the appellants were released on bail. Pursuant to the verification of the affidavit by the informant herself, the High Court, relying on the decisions of the Allahabad High Court, instead of deciding the issue of grant of anticipatory bail, proceeded to quash both the FIRs, i.e. Crime No. 351 of 2025 and Crime No.

354 of 2025.

RELIANCE ON PRECEDENTS – BEYOND THE SCOPE OF SECTION 14-A

In deciding the appeal, the Bombay High Court placed reliance on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Rahul Gupta and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 9930/2024), as well as the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Gulam Rasool Khan & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 1000/2018).

The Full Bench in Gulam Rasool Khan (supra) was constituted to answer questions, inter-alia, whether the aggrieved person will have two remedies i.e. Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act and section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as “Code”) or, contemporaneously, Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred as “BNSS”); whether an aggrieved person having remedy of appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act would be allowed to take recourse of section 482 of the Code; would there be any limitation to file an appeal under Section 14-A. the full bench, while answering the reference, held that since the provisions of Section 14-A have an overriding effect over the provisions of the code, the Aarit person will have only one recourse i.e. to file an appeal under Section 14-A. It was also held that an aggrieved person would not be allowed to take recourse of Section 482 of the code or Section 528 of the BNSS when the remedy under Section 14-A is available. It was further held that pursuant decision of another full bench of the Allahabad High Court, there would not be any limitation to file an appeal under Section 14-A. However, the Full Bench did not have any occasion to consider whether proceedings under the SC/ST Act could be compounded in an appeal under Section 14-A. The decision in Rahul Gupta (supra) appears to have interpreted the Full Bench decision as supporting the view that proceedings under the SC/ST Act may be compounded in a criminal appeal under Section 14-A.

High Court also placed reliance on Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635, wherein the Supreme Court observed that in cases where a dispute is primarily private or civil in nature and not on account of caste, and where continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process, the Supreme Court under Article 142 or the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or 528 of the BNSS may quash proceedings. Yet, again, the Supreme Court, did not consider the scope of Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act or held that such powers could be exercised within an appeal under that provision.

JURISDICTIONAL CONCERNS IN THE QUASHING OF FIRS

In the author's view, the Bombay High Court extended the scope of Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act beyond what was considered in the Full Bench decision in Gulam Rasool Khan (supra) and effectively treated the appeal as if it were a proceeding for quashing under Section 482 of the Code or 528 of the BNSS. Section 14-A provides a statutory appellate remedy, and the appeals before the Court arose from orders refusing anticipatory bail. The High Court also erred in observing that the Full Bench in Gulam Rasool Khan (supra) held that that the offence under the SC/ST Act may be compounded in a Criminal Appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the SC/ST Act and there is no need to take recourse of section 482 of the Code, since this issue was never dealt with by the Full Bench.

By proceeding to quash the FIR bearing Crime No. 351 of 2025 itself on the basis of settlement, the Court stepped into a domain ordinarily associated with the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of which, it did not have powers. This becomes more significant in light of the sitting list effective from January 5, 2026, under which the Bench did not have the assignment to exercise jurisdiction for quashing FIRs. The relevant assignments of the bench as per the sitting list effective from January 5, 2026 is produced:

“For admission, hearing, order matters and applications therein:

(A) Civil Contempt Petitions (Single Bench) from the year 2018 onward.

(B) All First Appeals other than MACP and Land Acquisition.

(C) All Civil work pertaining to Single Bench not assigned to other Courts.

(D) Criminal Writ Petitions and Criminal Applications u/s. 482 of Cr. P.C./528 of BNSS (other than quashing) up to the year 2021.

(E) Criminal Appeals against conviction as well as connected Appeals against acquittal and Appeals for enhancement of Sentence wherein accused are on Bail and connected appeals arising out of same judgments and all applications therein up to the year 2010.

(F) First Appeals pertaining to MACP up to the year 2010.

(G) All Criminal matters pertaining to Single Bench not assigned to other Courts.”

As per the sitting list, the bench did have the inherent powers under Section 482 of the code or Section 528 of BNSS, but it was except the powers of quashing. Thus, bench did not have the jurisdiction to quash proceedings, since that assignment was with other benches. Hence, the author is of the opinion that the Court, without having any jurisdiction as per the sitting list, went on to quash the FIRs, thereby committing judicial overreach. The quashing of FIRs therefore is in direct conflict with the internal judicial allocation of work.

Even though if it is assumed that the bench had the powers to quash the FIR, but the appeal was filed under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act seeking anticipatory bail, so even if the Court allows the appellants to seek such a prayer, without converting the appeal under 14-A into an application for quashing under Section 482 of the Code or 528 of the BNSS, the Court could not have quashed the FIRs. If the Court was of the opinion that in view of the settlement between the parties, the proceedings could have been quashed, then High Court could have either:

• permitted the appellants to convert that appeal into a Criminal Application seeking quashing and such a Criminal Application should have gone to the appropriate bench having the powers to quash FIRs; Or

• permitted appellants and the respondents to file a separate criminal application seeking quashing of FIRs;

Yet, without looking into any of these procedural requirements, the High Court went on to quash the FIRs.

GRANT OF RELIEF BEYOND THE SCOPE OF APPEAL

The author further considers the quashing of Crime No. 354 of 2025 particularly problematic. Even if it is assumed that the appellants sought quashing of Crime No. 351 of 2025, the High Court went further ahead and also quashed Crime No. 354 of 2025 registered against the informant and her relatives, wherein no petition or application was filed by them seeking such relief, in the nature of quashing.

In the author's assessment, this amounts to granting relief beyond the prayers and beyond the powers of the Court and in favour of persons who had not even approached the Court for quashing, thereby expanding the scope of the proceedings beyond the lis.

Such an order by the High Court would set a wrong precedent that without even filing any formal application or petition, in some other petition, one can get reliefs which were not even sought by the original applicant or petitioner before that court. The whole procedure of pleading and then arguing on the basis of the pleadings would be totally frustrated in view of such an order by the High Court. Based on this order, a person can file an application seeking one relief but meanwhile the respondents would pray for something else than what the petition was originally filed and secure relief in his favour. The decision affects the procedural requirements and has the potential of frustrating predictability of judicial outcomes. Judicial discretion, though wide, must operate within defined institutional boundaries.

From this perspective, the order represents a situation signifying departure from established jurisdictional and procedural norms; where, in a proceeding under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act arising out of rejection of anticipatory bail, the High Court relied on precedents concerning issues related remedies under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act and the interplay between the Section 482 of the Code or 528 of the BNSS and proceeded to quash two FIRs without having any powers to do so, including one against which not even a single pleading seeking such relief were sought by parties.

The author therefore concludes that the High Court travelled beyond its jurisdiction and the permissible scope of the proceedings, while quashing the FIRs in Crime Nos. 351 of 2025 and 354 of 2025. If left uncorrected, such an order would set a wrong precedent where the High Court has travelled far beyond its jurisdiction as per the roaster and powers and granted reliefs which, at no cost, could have been granted in such a proceeding.